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insignificant fact differences to make a distinction. The decision
in the principal case is in direct conflict with the North Dakota
case,12 but the Commission simply said "to the extent that North
Dakota may be inconsistent with the action we take here, we be-
lieve it was erroneously decided."13 This is a direct departure from
the judicial precedent established in that case.
The F.P.C. failed to recognize in the principal case the de-
cisions of the courts and followed its own ideas as to what its
jurisdiction should be. The court of appeals properly reversed. If
F.P.C. jurisdiction is to be expanded, it should be done by Con-
gressional action and not by its own decree.
W. Charles Tegeler
CONTRACTS: THE DEPOSITED ACCEPTANCE RULE
The rule that once an acceptance is deposited in the ffiail a
contract is formed' was recently adopted by the Supreme Court of
Florida in Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1968).
This case concerned a contract for the sale of real estate, mailed
to defendant by plaintiff. After execution of the contract, it was
placed in the mails addressed to the plaintiff. Prior to the arrival
of the contract, the defendant called the plaintiff and repudiated it.
The plaintiff demanded performance, and upon refusal, brought
suit.
The Florida court, following the English rule of Adams v.
Lindsell2 held that the parties were bound when the acceptance
was mailed. The plaintiffs depended oi Adams v. Lindsell, claim-
ing that an acceptance was binding upon mailing; the defendants
relied upon the cases of Dick v. United Statess and Rhode Island
Tool Co. v. United States4 claiming that an acceptance does not
create a contract until its receipt by the offeror. After a lengthy
discussion of the authorities, the court was more impressed by
commercial necessities, than by legal niceties. This was within the
spirit of Adams v. Lindsell which stated: "For if the defendants
were not bound by their offer when accepted by the plaintiffs till
the answer was received, then the plaintiffs ought not to be bound
till after they -had received the notification that the defendants had
received their answer and assented to it. And so it might go ad
12 North Dakota v. FTC, 247 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1957).
13sLo-Vaca Gathering Company & Houston Pipe Line Co., 26 F.P.C.
606, 615 (1961).
1 Granted statutory recognition by the Oklahoma legislature in 15 OMA.
STAT. § 69 (1961): "Consent is deemed to be fully communicated between
the parties as soon as the party accepting a proposal has put his acceptance
in the course of transmission to the proposer ....
2 1 Barn. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
3 113 Ct.Cl. 94, 82 F.Supp. 326 (1949).
4 130 Ct.CI. 698 128 F.Supp. 417 (1955).
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infinitum."5 The only discussion of legal theory in Adams v. Lindsell
was when the court stated that a mailed offer was "continuing"
and the offeror was deemed to be making an offer the entire time
it was traveling, and a meeting of the minds could be found upon
the posting of the acceptance. 6
Mactiers Adm'r v. Frith7 was the first case in this country to
consider the deposited acceptance rule, and it imported the rule
of Adams v. Lindsell to the American common-law. This court,
however, in discussing the rule, made the statement that a letter
written, but remaining in the possession of the writer would not
be acceptance. Thus, the issue of control over the letter of accept-
ance was introduced into litigation of this problem, and, as the
Morrison court points out, "Whereas Mactiers Adm'rs v. Frith,
supra, had made 'loss of control an operative fact, later courts
tended to make this the operative fact of conclusive legal signifi-
cance." This control theory noted in the Mactie4s case was not
adhered to by the United States Supreme Court when it handed
down its ruling in the second American case to consider the prob-
lem, Tayloe v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co.9 The reasoning the Supreme
Court in that case closely followed that of Adams v. Lindsell.
In Household Fire & Carriage Aco. Ins. Co. v. Grant,10 an
English Court of Appeals case, Lord Justice Thesiger approved
of the reasoning in the American Tayloe case by stating: "In prac-
tice a contract complete upon the acceptance of an offer being
posted, but liable to put an end to by an accident in the post, would
be more mischievous than a contract only binding upon the parties
to it upon the acceptance actually reaching the offerer, and I can
see no principle of law from which such an anomalous contract
can be deduced." 1 Thus, we again find a court speaking in terms
of a commercial necessity, but the Lord Justice went further: 'It
is impossible in transactions which pass between the parties at a
distance, and have to be carried on through the medium of cor-
respondance, to adjust conflicting rights between innocent parties.
so as to make the consequences of mistake on the part of a mutual
agent equally upon the shoulders of both." 2 By speaking in terms
of agency, we again find a court introducing the matter oP control
over the letter of acceptance. This language was interpreted as
meaning that the one choosing the method of communication should
G 1 Barn. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250, (K.B. 1818). Because of the
courts preoccupation with commercial necessities and practicalities, the rule
of Adamrs v. Lindsell has come to be known as a "businessman's rule." 1
CORBIN, CONTRaACrS § 78 (1963 ed.). But see note, 59 YALE LJ. 374, 376(1950).6 1 Barn. & Aid. 681, 682, 106 Eng.Rep. 250, 251 (K.B. 1818).
7 6 Wend. 103, 21 Am.Dec. 262 (N.Y. 1830).
8 155 So.2d 889, 900 (Fla. 1963).
950 U.S. (9 How.) 187 (1850).
10 4 Ex.D. 216 (Ct. App. 1879).
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bear the loss occasioned by the acts of a mutual agent.18
The side-issue of control became the operative factor in the
rulings of two recent cases, the effect of which were to overrule
the universality of the deposited acceptance maxim. Dick v. United
States14 and Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States5 discussed
the fact that previously, when a letter was posted it was beyond
the control of the sender, and became the property of the addressee.
But the court placed great weight upon the fact that post office
regulations now made it possible for a sender to retrieve his letter
if it could be intercepted prior to delivery,16 thereby making the
post office the agent of the sender up to the time of actual delivery.
It was, therefore, reasoned that the acceptance is not final until it
actually reached its destination.
The Florida court in the Morrison case rejects these decisions 17
placing emphasis upon the 'loss of control by the sender, and
attempts a return to the basic principles of Adams v. Lindsell by
fixing an arbitrary point when the contract is entered into. The
court states that the cases which attempted to provide additional
justification for the deposited acceptance rule, by introducing the
issue of control, had served only to confuse and weaken the essen-
tial validity of the rule because of the commercial necessities de-
manded in this situation. It was hinted that on purely legal grounds
the deposited acceptance rule cannot be upheld. Included in the
opinion is a quotation from Williston on Contracts'8 and his dis-
cussion of the deposited acceptance rule: ". . The court failed to
consider that since the proposed contract was bilateral, as is al-
most invariably any contract by mail, the so-called acceptance musp
also have become effective as a promise to the offeror in order to
create a contract.. . ." While effectively refuting every other argu-
ment, the Florida court does not deal with the contention made by
Williston, possibly because it did not wish to fall into the same
trap as other courts which -have previously considered the problem,
by attempting to provide further justification for the rule.
Williston's argument can be summed up thusly: the acceptance
is a counter promise, and as such must be communicated to be
binding. To be sure this is a valid argument, but acceptance does
not necessarily mean receipted notice by the offeror; acceptance
13 Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So.2d 889, 901 (Fla. 1963).
14 113 Ct.CI. 94, 82 F.Supp. 326 (1949).
15 130 Ct.Cl. 698, 128 F.Supp. 417 (1955).
16 The court cited 39 CFR 10.09, 10.10 (1939): "(c) On receipt of a re-
quest for the return of any article of mail matter the postmaster or railway
postal clerk to whom such request is addressed shall return such matter in a
penalty envelope, to the mailing postmaster, who shall deliver it to the
sender upon payment of all expenses and the regular rate of postage on the
matter returned..."
17 Dick v. United States, 113 Ct.Cl. 94, 82 F.Supp. 376 (1949); Rhode
Island Tool Co. v. United States 130 Ct.Cl. 698, 128 F.Supp. 417 (1955).
38 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 81 (3rd ed. 1957).
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is the manifested intent of both parties that the law should pre-
sume and annex to their mutual acts the obligation of contract.
The offeror manifests his intent when he makes his offer, and the
manifested intent of the offeree by acceptance, shows that he is
also desirous that the arrangement in the offer ripen into contract.' 9
But this manifested intent does not require that there be receipted
notice to the other party that the agreement is reached. Were
this notice necessary, then the only way a contract could be
effectuated would be by face-to-face dealing.20 The manifested
intent will be found in the acts of the parties, and the manifested
intent of the offeree that he accepts the offer, can be found in
the physical act of mailing his acceptance.
A contract, therefore, may arise without notice of acceptance
to the offeror. This acceptance or attempted acceptance notice, if
it does not reach the offeror, must be accepted by the means and
methods authorized by the offeror. If the offer does not state how
it is to be accepted, the method by which the offer was communi-
cated is the presumed authorized method of acceptance. If the
offeree does not utilize the authorized method of acceptance it is
not effective to create a binding contract, until or unless it is
received by the offeror, or unless it is received by the offeror within
the time that an acceptance sent by the authorized method would
have been received.2' Thus, an acceptance by telegraph to an offer
sent by mail requires no notice that the acceptance has been re-
ceived or accepted by the offeror.22
The deposited acceptance rule has arisen because of com-
mercial necessities and usages, and while harsh at times, it is
the best solution that many courts have arrived at for this prob-
lem. In the light of the case of Morrison v. Thoelke, an offer should
specify how an acceptance should be made, and when it will create
a binding contract between the parties.23 A wider use of this pro-
cedure would relieve the courts of the unwanted burden of de-
ciding this type of contract case upon arbitrary commercial neces-
sity. Ronnie Main
19 See lESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 22, 52 (1932).
20 See Ashley, Formation of Contract Inter Absentea, 2 COLJM. L.R.
1 (1902).
21 See RE:TATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 66 (1932).
22 However, the offeree in communicating his acceptance runs the risk
of having the telegraph company misdirect his acceptance. The issue of the
agency of the transmitter became important in an Iowa case when an offer
was sent by mail, and the acceptance by telegraph which was misdirected. The
court held that the offeree had made the telegraph company his agent, there-
fore, the acceptance wasn't complete until it had been received by the offeror.
Lucas v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 N.W. 191, 131 Iowa 669. See
RPESTAT-EENT, CONTRACTS, § 67 (1932).
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